We study the optimal production-inventory-outsourcing policy for a firm with Markovian in-house production capacity that faces independent stochastic demand and has the option to outsource. We find very simple optimal policy forms under fairly reasonable assumptions. In addition, when the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone, the policy parameters decrease in the firm's current capacity level under additional assumptions. All these results extend to the infinite-horizon and undiscounted-cost cases. We analyze comparative statics and the necessity of some technical conditions, and discuss when the outsourcing option is more valuable.
Introduction
Outsourcing has become prevalent in all industries, both as a strategic tool to maintain a firm's brand integrity while retaining low cost, and as a tactical means to hedge against capacity and/or demand uncertainties while maintaining the firm's market share. At the strategic level, outsourcing, often to offshore locations and of an entire section of production, has the benefits of lower operating cost; quicker ramp-up time; more ease of adding and dropping programs, services, and markets; and potentially fewer regulatory constraints (Elmaghraby 2000, Quinn and Hilmer 1994) .
The benefit of using outsourcing (subcontracting) as a tactical solution to a firm's daily needs can also be substantial. A firm usually does not have total control over its demand or even its capacity, for it is constantly faced with factors like fluctuating demand streams, unreliable suppliers, and partially uncontrollable in-house elements such as the work force, machines, power and water supply, etc. Therefore, the sporadic use of external capacity, when economically feasible, is a good countermeasure to battle the occurrences of delivery delays or lost sales.
Research on tactical outsourcing has mostly been concentrated on the strategic questions related to price setting, capacity investing, and contract writing. For instance, using a multiperiod game-theoretical model, Kamien and Li (1990) presented conditions under which tactical outsourcing should be carried out and showed that it has the effect of production smoothing. Van Mieghem (1999) used a two-stage game-theoretical model to analyze outsourcing conditions for three types of contracts between a firm and its subcontractor, with different levels of flexibility on setting outsourcing costs. The study demonstrated the advantage of the type of contracts with flexible or negotiable outsourcing costs over the type of contracts with pre-fixed outsourcing costs.
There also exists a sizable related body of literature concerning a retailer's use of a faster and necessarily more expensive secondary supply source to compensate for the sluggishness of the primary supply source. Barankin (1961) , Fukuda (1964) , Neuts (1964) , Sethi et al. (2001 Sethi et al. ( , 2003 , and Wright (1968) all derived the optimal policy forms for variants of such problems under the assumption that the lead time of the secondary source is one period less than that of the primary source. For a problem with arbitrary lead times, Whittemore and Saunders (1977) found the optimal policy to be of a very complex form. Chiang and Gutierrez (1996) treated a problem where the lead time of the secondary source is a fraction of that of the primary source, which in turn is shorter than the inventory review period. Chiang and Gutierrez (1998) extended the problem to allow the order from the secondary source to be made more frequently. Using dynamic programming techniques, they derived useful properties about the optimal policies for both problems. Vlachos and Tagaras (2001) and Tagaras and Vlachos (2001) considered undiscounted-cost problems where both the two lead times and the review cycle are integer multiples of a basic period and only one ordering from the secondary source is allowed per review cycle.
This paper aims to offer a better understanding of tactical outsourcing, where a firm is essentially a make-to-stock capacitated production system and employs an external source when its own in-house production cannot satisfy demands in a timely fashion. In our particular setting, the firm has a Markovian and sometimes stochastically monotone capacity and faces an independent stochastic demand stream. Our goal is to characterize as much as possible the firm's optimal production and outsourcing policies.
The rationale behind the choice of our setting is explained in the following. The uncertainty in demand often stems from the uncoordinated decision making by a vast number of customers, while the uncertainty in capacity comes from a limited number of dependent and independent sources such as raw material suppliers, the labor force, machines, and power and water supply, whose conditions are highly correlated over time. Hence, assuming capacity to be Markovian and demand to be independent is a reasonable choice. Furthermore, there often exists a certain kind of "continuity in time" in the conditions of the firm's various internal components like the labor force and machines that translates into the "continuity in time" in its overall capacity. To better understand its implication, we adopt the concept of stochastic monotonicity to rigorously capture this time-continuity property, which indeed enables us to derive useful and intuitive results.
For a firm constrained by a fixed capacity, Zipkin (1986a, 1986b) found the optimal policy to be of the modified base-stock type, whereas the firm should produce as much as is allowed by the capacity to a specified base-stock point. Other studies in this vein include Tayur (1994, 1995) , Kapuscinski and Tayur (1998), and Tayur (1992) . Ciarallo et al. (1994) considered a random, and yet still independent, capacity stream. They found the optimal policy to be still of the base-stock type. Wang and Gerchak (1996) showed the optimal policy to be of a generalized base-stock type when both capacity and production yield are random.
Some authors used means other than the introduction of random capacities to model uncertainties on the supply side. Arreola-Risa and DeCroix (1998) found the best parameters for the s S policy when supply is disrupted for periods of random durations. Gupta (1996) analyzed a continuous-review inventory system adopting the Q r policy whose supply is unavailable for periods of exponentially distributed durations. Parlar (1997) considered a continuous-review inventory control model with random lead time where the supply is alternately available and unavailable for random durations. Parlar et al. (1995) showed the optimality of the s S policy for an inventory system with setup cost subject to Markovian supply availability.
There are papers whose settings are close to ours. Scheller-Wolf and Tayur (2000) studied a problem with two supply sources (effectively, in-house production and outsourcing) and Markov-process driven production bands (lower and upper bounds), costs, and demand levels. They discovered the optimality of base-stock-type policies for the problem under certain conditions. Bradley (2004 Bradley ( , 2005 studied the same production-inventory-outsourcing problem in the continuous-time setting. He focused on the basestock policy, treated the external source as capacitated as well, and also considered the issue of in-house capacity investment. In (2005), Bradley proved the optimality of the base-stock policy when both sources form M/M/1 queues, while in (2004) he employed Brownian approximation to assess the performances of the base-stock policy under more general conditions. For both cases, the author was able to obtain a closed-form expression for one of the base levels; and through numerical studies, he showed the benefits brought forth by the outsourcing option in reducing inventory costs and, more importantly, in reducing in-house capacity investment.
On the other hand, we only know of two other papers that considered both the Markovian-style evolution and stochastic monotonicity on the supply side. One is Song and Zipkin (1996) , whose focal point was the lead time. They showed that the optimal policy retains its conventional form, albeit being supply-state-dependent. The stochastic monotonicity property also results in the monotonicity of the policy parameter under certain circumstances. The other is Yang et al. (2004) . They studied the optimal production and order rejection policy for a firm facing Markovian capacity. The policy parameters were found to be monotone as well when the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone.
In our paper, the firm is constrained by a Markovian in-house production capacity, and yet has to face a random demand stream. The firm is allowed to outsource part of its production to an external source, which on top of the unit costs charges a setup cost. The outsourcing setup cost reflects the extra bookkeeping and other activities unlikely to be avoided when ordering from an external source, and it is one of the factors that sets our paper apart from the aforementioned recent papers. The other important feature of our model is its recourse nature. This is caused by our assumption that the time points at which realizations of the current capacity and demand levels occur separate the time points at which decisions of production and outsourcing are made.
After making reasonable assumptions about the production and outsourcing lead times and the various cost function forms, we are able to derive simple and intuitive properties about both outsourcing and production policies. These properties include: (1) that the optimal outsourcing policy is always of the s S type, (2) that the optimal production policy is of the modified base-stock type when certain other conditions are satisfied, (3) that the optimal policies are of the base-stock type when there is no outsourcing setup cost, and (4) that the optimal policy parameters are monotone in the current capacity level when the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone and there is no outsourcing setup cost. These properties will serve as guidelines for real firms which practice tactical outsourcing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we make the necessary technical assumptions and establish our mathematical model for the problem; in §3, we derive main properties about the optimal outsourcing and production policies. In §4, we show that some policy parameters are monotone in the current capacity level when the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone. We then extend the results to the discrete-state discounted and undiscounted infinite-horizon cases in §5. In §6, we report our computational results, which help justify some of the conditions associated with our theoretical results and exemplify the benefits of adopting state-dependent policies and utilizing the outsourcing options. In §7, we present our conclusions.
Model, Notation, and Assumptions
Throughout, we use the terms positive, negative, increasing, decreasing, (quasi-)convex, and K-(quasi-)convex, all in the nonstrict sense. We use a positive integer t to denote a period and follow the convention that period 0 is the terminal period and that after period 0, all costs are 0. When the lead time for production is 0 and that for outsourcing is 1, the dynamics of the inventory system are very easy to describe: At the very beginning of period t, the firm's inventory level is I t after it receives the previous period's outsourcing amount z t+1 . Once the firm observes its current capacity level t , it decides the current production level x t . Then, the firm observes and satisfies as much as possible the current demand that amounts to t , with its unsatisfied portion being backlogged. Finally, the firm decides the current outsourcing level z t . Therefore, for the rest of the period, the firm's inventory holding backlogging level is J t = I t + x t − t . After it has just received the current outsourcing amount in the beginning of the next period, the firm's inventory becomes
For the more general case where the lead times for production and outsourcing are, respectively, positive integers L and L O , the description of the system dynamics becomes more involved: At the beginning of period t, the firm's inventory level is I 
When L 2, it is quite unnatural to assume that the currently known capacity t , updated once every period, holds the upper limit for a production run that lasts for L periods. However, this can occur when the first production stage, lasting between 0 and 1 period, poses as the bottleneck stage for the entire production facility, or raw material availability alone determines the production capacity, or the last L − 1 to L periods of the production run involve merely transportation activities.
Letp t 0 be the unit cost of production, K t 0 be the setup cost of outsourcing,q t 0 be the unit variable cost of outsourcing, and H t I 0 with H t 0 = 0-which is decreasing when I < 0 and increasing when I > 0-be the cost of holding and backlogging. For strictly negative ts, we assume all costs are 0. Also, let ∈ 0 1 be the discount factor over the span of one period. Suppose that the firm's capacity and demand levels in each period are mutually independent and are independent of its decisions. Furthermore, suppose its demand levels in different periods are mutually independent as well. On the other hand, suppose that the firm's capacities in different periods form a Markov process.
From now on, and up to §4, we work explicitly under the continuous-state setting, whose precise definition is made with the existence of certain continuous distribution functions to be introduced soon. When distributions are properly replaced by probability masses, derivatives are replaced by differences, and integrations are replaced by summations, we will achieve corresponding results for policies and cost functions under the discrete-state setting, where inventory, capacity, and demand levels are all confined to integer values. We opt to first work under the continuous-state setting because most work in productioninventory control are done in this setting. From §5 on, however, we switch back to the discrete-state setting. Now, we let continuous function f C t be the probability density of capacity t being at the level when the previous period's capacity is . In a degenerate special case, we will let all capacities be deterministic as¯ 1 ¯ 2 . We let continuous function f D t be the probability density of demand t being at level . We define the above density functions on − + even though they vanish on − 0 . To guarantee the finiteness of the cost functions to be defined later, we make the assumption that E t < + for every t.
The firm's inventory position I t at the beginning of period t is its inventory level plus the total on-order production and outsourcing amount: 
and if
We have L O = L when outsourcing is as fast as in-house production and L O = L + 1 when outsourcing is one period slower than in-house production. Due to the extra transaction and transportation activities involved in outsourcing, the latter case is more probable. For these cases, Equations (2) and (3) are almost the same except for the inventory-cost term, and the effect of a strictly positive L is rather superficial. From now on, we shall concentrate on a special case of the second case where L = 0 and L O = 1. All our results can be extended to the two more general cases with only slight modifications. For other cases where
L + 2, we have found that more variables will be needed to describe the system state, and the corresponding control problem is much more complex. Now, when L = 0 and
I , which can be thought of as the total expected cost from the present to the end, plus the cost of the least sunk effort needed to achieve the current inventory level.
We introduce G t I because it can take advantage of the linear production cost better than G t I can. Now we have
and for t = 1 2 ,
That is,
Note the recourse nature of the above optimization problem due to the time-separate realizations of capacity and demand levels within one single period. The optimal solution y * t I for (6) constitutes our optimal production policy: It tells what the optimal produce-up-to level should be when the current capacity level is and the inventory level right before production is I. On the other hand, the optimal solution w * t J for (8) constitutes our optimal outsourcing policy: It tells what the optimal outsource-up-to level should be when the current capacity level is and the inventory level right before making the outsourcing decision is J . Throughout this paper, we use d x f x as a shorthand for the ordinary derivative df x /dx and use x f x y as a shorthand for the partial derivative f x y / x y . With Assumption 1, the derivative of any cost function to appear later can be iteratively found to be bounded by ±10 M/ 1 − . By the Dominated Convergence Theorem (see, e.g., Wheeden and Zygmund 1977) , we can interchange the order of differentiation and expectation of any of these cost functions.
The Optimal Policies

The Optimal Outsourcing Policy
Under some mild assumptions, we are able to show that the optimal outsource-up-to level w * t J follows the s S type, where both parameters are -dependent. To prove this, we need to briefly review the concepts of K-convexity and K-quasi-convexity that are closely related to the s S policy.
Definition 1. For a positive constant K, f x is said to be K-convex if and only if for any x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 such that
Definition 2. For a positive constant K, f x is said to be K-quasi-convex if and only if for any x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 such that x 1 < x 2 < x 3 , we never have f x 1 < f x 2 f x 3 + K.
A 0-(quasi-)convex function is merely a (quasi-)convex function. It is very well known and also very easy to
The following well-known lemma links K-quasi-convexity with the s S policy and shows the preservation of continuity and K-convexity through a certain minimization operation. Porteus provided proofs for these results (2002) (p. 142, Lemmas 9.11 and 9.12).
Lemma 1. Suppose that f x = inf K · 1 y > x + g y y x and g y is continuous and K-quasi-convex. Then, there will exist two parameters s and S with s S (both allowed to be ± ), such that for every
, where y * x = S · 1 x < s + x · 1 x s , and, f x will be continuous. Also, if g y is K-convex, then f x will be K-convex as well.
With the capacitated production, the preservation of K-convexity and continuity through the minimization operation in (6) is not previously known. The following lemma shows that K-convexity and continuity can indeed be preserved.
Lemma 2. Suppose that K and C are two positive constants and g y is a K-convex and continuous function. Then, f x = inf g y x y x + C will also be a K-convex and continuous function.
Proof. Because x x + C is a compact set and g y is continuous, we can always find a y * x ∈ x x + C such that f x = g y * x . Let x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 be such that
Consequently, we can swap the positions of y * x 1 and y * x 3 . So, from now on we may always assume that y
By the K-convexity of g y and the positivity of K, no matter whether y * x 1 < y * x 3 or y * x 1 = y * x 3 , we always have
Combining (10) and (11), and noting the way y 2 is defined, we obtain
Because g y is continuous, it is uniformly continuous on any bounded and closed interval. So, for any > 0, we can find a ∈ 0 C such that for any y 1 y 2 ∈ 0 x +C + satisfying y 1 − y 2 < , we would have g y 1 − g y 2 < . For any x ∈ 0 , let f 0 = inf g y y ∈ x + x, x + C . Then, we must have
It therefore follows that f x + x − f x < .
Assumption 2. For any t, H t I is convex.
Assumption 2 is a common assumption used in inventory control literature, which captures the case of linear holding and backlogging costs. A convex function is both K-convex for any K 0 and continuous. 
solves the optimization problem (6).
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. G 0 I has a value of zero, and therefore is K 0 -convex and continuous. For t = 1 2 , suppose that G t−1 I is K t−1 -convex and continuous. Due to (9) and Assumption 3, F t w is continuous and K t−1 -convex, and hence K tconvex. By (8) and Lemma 1, the property for w J is true, and F t J is K t -convex and continuous. By (7) and Assumption 2, G t y is K t -convex and continuous. Finally, G t I is K t -convex and continuous due to (6) and Lemma 2. Now define S * t ands * t so that
w Now, we know that the optimal outsourcing policy is s S , as long as the production activity is also conducted in an optimal fashion, regardless of what particular form the optimal production policy is in. A sufficient condition for the production policy to be of the modified base-stock type is that G t I is quasi-convex or even convex in I. For two special cases, we are able to provide such a sufficient condition.
Production Policy for the Deterministic Capacity Case
In this subsection, we assume that capacities are deterministic. Then, many previous capacity-dependent entities become capacity independent, and we will drop the corresponding capacity dependencies in their notations accordingly. Previously, many quantities associated with t = 0 were not defined. Here, for convenience, we make the following definitions:q 0 =p 0 , H 0 I = 0, and
Then, according to (4), (6), (7), (8), and (9), we have for t = 1 2 , that
Therefore, it is also true that
It is also easy to check that G 0 y = 0. Equation (19) reflects the fact that, with capacities being deterministic, the decision the firm has to make within each period is no longer the two-layered one with recourse as in the random capacity case, but in fact a single-layered one. We may still pretend that the produce-up-to level is contingent upon the inventory level right before production, but indeed it can be well determined at the time when the previous period's outsourcing decision is being made, because there is no uncertainty in the interim between the two mentioned time points. When the demand distribution is of a special form and other reasonable conditions are satisfied, we can show that the optimal production policy, when still being considered as contingent upon the inventory level right before production, is of the modified base-stock type.
Let the solution of (15) 
Then, we know that
The following lemma says that when outsourcing is more expensive than production, there will be no outsourcing unless the production capacity has been exhausted. We certainly cannot have this result when the capacities are random.
Proof. Suppose that w y is a feasible solution for (19) that satisfies both w > J and y < w +¯ t−1 . Let = min w − J w +¯ t−1 − y . Then, w − y is another feasible solution for (19) with a cost saving of at least q t − p t−1 · . Therefore, the optimal solution w * t J y * t−1 J for (19) must satisfy the desired complementary slackness relation.
We now suppose that q t − p t−1 is positive for all ts. By (21) 
We will call a function f x differentiable when it has both left and right derivatives, while they do not necessarily equal each other. We say d x f x 0 is within a certain bound if both of its derivatives are within that bound. The following lemma shows that d y G t y is bounded. Its lower bound will be of particular use to our later proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. When the F t J s, F t w s, G t I s, and G t y s are differentiable, for t = 0 1 2
, it is always true that
We prove the lower bound first. For t = 0, the inequality is obvious. Now, we assume that t 1. By (15), we have d J F t J −q t . Then, by (18), we have
The desired inequality follows immediately due to the convexity of H t I . We now prove the upper bound. By (15), (16), (17), and (18), we easily obtain that for t = 1 2 ,
By combining these inequalities with the fact that G 0 y = 0, we get the desired result. Now, we introduce the two concepts that are essential to our derivations leading to the modified base-stock production policy.
Definition 3. A function f x is said to be with Polya frequency of order 2 (PF 2 ) if for any x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2 , it is true that f
Definition 4. A function f x is said to be upward if it changes sign at most once from − to + (or does not change sign at all) as x traverses from − to + .
A continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable function f x will be quasi-convex if d x f x is upward. It is known that if f x is PF 2 and g x is upward and bounded, then the convolution r x = + − g y f x − y dy is upward (see, e.g., Karlin 1968, Theorem 3 .1 of Chapter 5, p. 233). Also according to Karlin, a wide variety of commonly seen probability densities are PF 2 . They include such discrete distributions as Poisson and binomial and such continuous distributions as uniform, exponential, and normal.
The following theorem states that the optimal production policy is of the modified base-stock type when the demand distribution is PF 2 and certain other conditions are satisfied. 
Theorem 2. Under the conditions that for
Because this proof is lengthy, it is included in the appendix for the interested reader. All conditions imposed on the theorem except Condition (d) are easy to understand. Condition (a), as mentioned before, reasonably requires that outsourcing be more expensive than production; Condition (b) states that the backlogging cost more than offsets the savings achievable from delayed production; and Condition (c) states that the holding cost more than offsets the savings achievable from advanced production. Meanwhile, Condition (e), stating that the demand distribution is PF 2 , plays a pivotal role in the preservation of the upwardness of d y G t y through the aforementioned result concerning the convolution between an upward function and a PF 2 function.
For a better understanding of Condition (d), suppose that there are positive constantsh t andb t for all ts that make H t I =h t · I + +b t · I − . Then, the condition can be expressed as
Clearly, Condition (d) implies the following: Compared to the capacity level, the demand level is not too huge; and compared to production and holding costs, outsourcing and backlogging costs are not too high. We will discuss the necessity of Conditions (d) and (e) for the validity of the base-stock-type optimal production policy in §6.2.1. In particular, our numerical analysis showed that the PF 2 requirement on the demand distribution is necessary, and that Condition (d) might have room for improvement, but cannot be eliminated.
Production Policy for the Zero-Outsourcing Setup-Cost Case
In this subsection, we assume that there is no outsourcing setup cost. In view of Theorem 1, we haves * t = S * t , and the outsourcing policy collapses into a base-stock policy, while at the same time, the K t -convexity of 
solves the optimization problem (6).
The necessity of the zero-outsourcing setup-cost assumption for the validity of the base-stock-type optimal production policy will be further discussed in §6.2.2. This result is hardly surprising given that without the involvement of any setup cost, all involved cost functions are now convex. However, even in the current more restricted setting, our model is different first of all from single-source models and somewhat from other dual-source models. The first point will be obvious from the fact that different unit costs, namelyp t andq t , are still assumed for production and outsourcing. The most important differences between our model and other dual-source models are: (1) most dualsource models do not impose capacity limitations (SchellerWolf and Tayur 2000 and Wright 1968 are exceptions); (2) almost all dual-source models assume that a faster source costs more than a slower source with the implicit trade-off being between speed and cost, while in our model the faster source (in-house production) needs the help of the more costly and probably slower source (outsourcing) due exclusively to its finite capacity; and (3) our model involves optimization with recourse, while almost all dual-source models involve simultaneous multivariable optimization (see, e.g., Chiang and Gutierrez 1998; Scheller-Wolf and Tayur 2000; Sethi et al. 2001 Sethi et al. , 2003 Tagaras and Vlachos 2001) .
Stochastically Monotone Capacity
General Results
Definition 5. For two random variables X and Y , we say X is stochastically larger than Y , denoted as X st Y , when for every real number z, we have Pr X z Pr Y z ; that is, when X is more likely to be larger than any given number than Y .
We say that a firm's capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone when for any t, , and any 0, we have
; that is, when a higher current capacity level is more prone to lead to a higher capacity level in the ensuing period. Stochastic monotonicity on the supply side was also considered by Song and Zipkin (1996) , whose focal point was the lead time. There, the stochastic monotonicity property resulted in the monotonicity of the policy parameter under certain circumstances Similar monotonicity was also established in the literature on demand process, e.g., Song and Zipkin (1993) .
When two random variables X and Y satisfy that X st Y , it is known that E f X E f Y for any increasing function, and in particular, E X E Y (see, e.g., Ross 1983) . So, if the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone, then for any increasing function f x , t, , and any 0, we will have E f t + E f t . One discrete-state example for the stochastic monotonicity of the firm's capacity Markov process comes from the following N -machine example. The firm has N machines, where each machine has two states, up and down. In each period, the number of machines that are up is the firm's capacity. Suppose that each machine's state evolves as a Markov chain, with the probability of it being up in the next period given that it is up in the current period being p, and the probability of it being down in the next period given that it is down in the current period being q. That is, each machine is up and down intermittently, and the up time follows the geometric distribution with mean 1/p and the down time follows the geometric distribution with mean 1/q, where we have letp = 1 − p andq = 1 − q.
Obviously, the firm's capacity evolves as a Markov chain as well. The average capacity E = Nq/ p +q because of the balance requirement pE +q N − E = E , and the limiting distribution of the chain is binomial with parameters N andq/ p +q . In Yang et al. (2004) , it has been proven that the Markov chain is stochastically monotone if and only if p + q 1.
The following theorem says that under the stochastic monotonicity hypothesis, a higher current capacity level leaves the firm better off for the time to come.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the firm's capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone. Then, for t
I is a decreasing function of .
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. First, G 0 I is independent of . Suppose for some t = 1 2 , G t−1 I decreases in . By (9) and the aforementioned fact regarding conditional expectations over a monotone function, we know F t w decreases in . After increases, as for the optimization problem (8), its objective function decreases while the feasible region is untouched. So F t J decreases in . By (7), we know G t y decreases in . After increases, as for the optimization problem (6), its objective function decreases while the feasible region expands. Therefore, G t I decreases in .
No Setup Cost for Outsourcing
The following Theorem 5 says that under the stochastic monotonicity hypothesis and when outsourcing setup costs are zero, a higher current capacity level makes it less appealing to have a higher inventory level. As a consequence, the base-stock levels for both outsourcing and production decrease in the current capacity level. (6), we now have the following identity:
The monotonicity of B * t , B * t − , and y G t y together force that I G t I increase in .
We will discuss the necessity of the assumptions of zerooutsourcing setup costs and stochastically monotone capacity Markov process for the monotonicity of the optimal policy parameters in §6.2.3. We also note that the current result is similar in spirit to the one given in Sethi et al. (2003, Theorem 3. 3).
Extension to the Infinite-Horizon Cases
From this section on, we assume that the inventory system's states are discrete. As mentioned in §2, all results in the previous two sections will remain valid once proper replacements are made. Here, we inherit the discrete-state counterparts of all previous assumptions. Also, we assume that all given parameters are stationary, and will hereafter suppress the t signs associated with them as long as no confusion shall arise. Moreover, we assume that the capacity Markov chain is irreducible and the demand is nonzero (there would be nothing to prove if it were zero). For any integer-variable function f x , we let x f x = f x +1 −f x . Also, leth 0 = I H 0 andh = I H + be the minimum and maximum unit holding costs, respectively, andb 0 = − I H −1 andb = − I H − be the minimum and maximum unit backlogging costs, respectively. All these values are finite by Assumption 1.
Our goal is to show that all the properties enjoyed by the cost functions and policies are still retained by the counterparts of the functions and policies in both the discounted and undiscounted discrete-state infinite-horizon cases. In the following, we just present the most important results. All definitions, intermediate technical lemmas, and proofs are relegated to the appendix. 
The Undiscounted Case
We are to show that under additional mild and reasonable assumptions, all the previous results are still valid when there is no discount over time and the criterion is to minimize the expected time-average cost. Here, we inherit all previous assumptions with being replaced by 1. Also, whenever the concept of "the current period" is needed, we assume this period to be period 0 (periods after the current period will be associated with negative numbers).
Let
be the set of all history-dependent policies, prescribing actions x −t and z −t for the firm in any period −t given the evolutionary history of the system. For a system that, starting from the current state 0 I 1 , evolves under the Markovian capacity stream, the independent demand stream, and an arbitrary policy in , we use I −t to denote the system's inventory level in the very beginning of period −t. The undiscounted-cost problem seeks a policy in that solves g = inf lim sup
Theorem 2.1 in Chapter V of Ross (1983) says that, as long as G I in (29) is uniformly bounded in the entire I -space, the aboveg and can be solved by solving the alternativẽ
where G I bears the interpretation of the relative costliness of the state I when the system evolves under the optimal policy starting from it. The aforementioned requirement is too strong for our problem here. However, a closer study of the proof offered in Ross reveals that we actually only need lim sup
for any 0 I 0 -pair and any ∈ 0 ⊂ , where 0 contains the optimal policy. In this section, we solve (29) first and then prove (30) for the thus-found G I .
We now add an superscript to any infinite-horizon entity associated with discount factor . For the solvability issue, the requiredg can be chosen as a limit point of
− for a fixed 0 I 0 = 0 -pair, and for any and I, the required G I can be chosen as a limit point of
Theorem 10. In any sequence n n = 0 1 2 , there exists a subsequence, say i n n = 0 1 2 , such that g i n 0 I 0 converges as n tends to + . Theorem 11. In any sequence n n = 0 1 2 , there exists a subsequence, say i n n = 0 1 2 , such that for any and I, G i n I converges as n tends to + .
Use an arbitrary sequence n n = 0 1 2 converging to 1 − as the -sequence assumed in Theorem 10, and then use the resulting -subsequence as the -sequence assumed in Theorem 11. We ultimately obtain a subsequence i n n = 0 1 2 , as well converging to 1 − , such thatg i n 0 I 0 converges, say tog, and that G i n I for any and I converges, say to G I . The following Theorem 12 corresponds to Theorem 7 in the discounted case.
Theorem 12.g and G I , thus-defined, solve Equation (29).
The solutions y * I = I + x * I and w * J = J + z * J for (29) would constitute the optimal policy for this undiscounted case had we proved (30). Theorems 13 and 14 confirm that all properties possessed by the finitehorizon policies are possessed by the undiscounted averagecost criterion policies as well. Assumption 10 connotes that the firm's average capacity does not exceed the average demand by too much. This is particularly true when its capacity Markov chain is positive recurrent and has a finite long-run average capacity.
Theorem 15. The identity (30) is true for a properly defined
0 , and hence (29) is the optimality equation for our undiscounted-cost case. 
Discussion
In this section, computational results are presented that help to justify some of the conditions associated with our earlier results, and show the benefits of taking the Markovstyle evolution of the production capacity into managerial consideration as well as the advantages of the outsourcing opportunities.
Settings for the Computational Study
Because the examples are all of the discrete-state nature, we can resort to the brute-force dynamic programming technique to calculate the optimal contingency plans. In all our examples, parameters are stationary. Hence, the t signs will be suppressed whenever possible. As a default, we let p = 10,q = 11, K = 30, = 0 99, and H I =h 0 · I + + b 0 · I − with default valuesh 0 = 1 andb 0 = 2. For the stochastic production capacity, we use two models: the aforementioned N -machine model as the default one and another one that we name the polarized model. For the N -machine model, our default parameters are N = 20, p = 0 9, and q = 0 7. For thus-chosen p and q, the firm's capacity Markov chain is stochastically monotone, and its long-run expected capacity is E = Nq/ p +q = 20 × 0 3/ 0 1 + 0 3 = 15. In the polarized model, the capacity can only change 1 unit per transition. Specifically, suppose that the maximum capacity is N . Then, for = 1 2 N − 1, P t = − 1 = 1 − /N , P t = + 1 = /N ; and P t = 1 0 = 1, P t = N − 1 N = 1. We call this model polarized because in it the firm's capacity tends to stay at either very high or very low levels. Because of symmetry, the longrun expected capacity in the model is N /2. Note that the N -machine model is reasonably close to reality, while the polarized model is an extreme case where future capacity levels are strongly dependent on the current capacity level.
We use two different demand distributions. Our default demand distribution is a modified Poisson distribution defined as follows. Let 0 and be two integers. modified Poisson distribution has P = i = i for i = 0 1 0 , and P = i = 0 for all other is. It is easy to prove that this distribution is PF 2 . Our default parameters for this model are = 14 and 0 = 35. We also have the occasion to use a discrete uniform demand distribution U a b , which is defined on a a + 1 b , with a and b being positive integers and a b. For such a distribution,
In the following, all our examples are with the default configurations unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Discussion of Necessary Conditions
We demonstrate examples found from the computational study in which the claims made by our earlier theorems collapse under the relaxation of certain assumptions.
6.2.1. On Theorem 2's Assumptions. Theorem 2 has five conditions, of which the first three are quite natural. Therefore, we only discuss Conditions (d) and (e). In the following examples, Conditions (a)-(c) are always satisfied.
We first investigate the necessity of Condition (d). In doing this, we use a PF 2 demand distribution with only two possible values with P = 7 = P = 8 = 0 5. The constant capacity level¯ is either 2, 3, or 4. Then, Condition (d) is violated in that the left-hand side of (25) is 1 while its right-hand side is 0 184255. Under the three different constant capacity levels, Table 1 reports the optimal produce-up-to levels y * 8 I at time t = 8 and various inventory levels I. In the entry corresponding to¯ = 2 and I = 22, it is optimal to bring the inventory level up to 24 instead of keeping the inventory level unchanged. This implies that the optimal production policy is not of the modified base-stock type. In the table, we have bold produce-up-to levels that deviate from the supposed modified base-stock policy. We then study the necessity of Condition (e), which insists that the demand distribution be PF 2 . Let H I = 2 · I + + 2 · I − , the constant capacity level¯ be either 5, 6, or 7. Let the demand distribution be non-PF 2 in that P = 0 = 0 25, P = 2 = 0 45, P = 20 = 0 3, and P = = 0 for all other s. This example does not violate Condition (d) because the left-hand side of (25) is 0.3, while its right-hand side is 0.301291. Table 2 reports the optimal produce-up-to levels y * 10 I . As in Table 1 , we have bold produce-up-to levels that deviate from the supposed modified base-stock policy.
6.2.2. On Theorem 3's Assumption. Theorem 3 states that the optimal production policy is of the modified basestock type under stochastic capacity levels when K = 0. To show the necessity of the condition K = 0, we use the polarized capacity model with N = 20 and the uniform discrete demand distribution U 9 11 , and let the outsourcing setup cost K be at its default value 30. We find that the optimal production policy is not of the modified base-stock type. Table 3 reports some of the irregularities in the optimal production policy at t = 6. 6.2.3. On Theorem 5's Assumptions. Theorem 5 says that the optimal policy parameters decrease with the current capacity level when the outsourcing setup cost is 0 and the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone. We first demonstrate the necessity of the zero-setup-cost assumption. We use the default modified Poisson demand with = 3 and the N -machine capacity model with N = 6 and p = q = 0 99, and let the outsourcing setup cost K = 50. Our study shows that the parameters of the optimal outsourcing policy may be nonmonotone with the capacity . Table 4 shows some of the parameters at time t = 10.
Next, we show the necessity of the assumption that the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone. We use a stochastically nonmonotone capacity Markov chain where P = 3 0 = 1, P = 0 1 = 1, P = 2 2 = P = 3 2 = 1/2, P = 0 3 = P = 1 3 = P = 2 3 = 1/3, and P = n m = 0 for other m ns. We let the demand distribution be of the default modified Poisson form with = 1. When the outsourcing setup cost is 0, the optimal outsourcing policy becomes a base-stock policy with parameters S * t and the optimal production policy is of the modified base-stock type with parameters B * t . We find that these parameters are not monotone in at t = 20, as shown in Table 5 . Note that there is no definition for B * t when = 0.
Value of the Markovian Structure
In the following, we always use the infinite-horizon results to conduct our comparisons. First, we compare the performance of our model with that of the model in which the Markov-style evolution of the capacity is ignored; i.e., the performance of the model in which production capacities over different periods are considered independent. The optimal policy neglecting the Markovian property of the capacity can be found by letting P t = n t+1 = m be the steady-state probability of the capacity level being at n regardless of m. For our N -machine model, this probability can be easily computed because we know its steady-state distribution is binomial. For any other model, we can obtain the corresponding steady-state distribution by solving P = and i = 1, where P is the one-step transition matrix for the capacity evolution and is the row vector containing all steady-state probabilities. Each cost term reported below is the steady-state average cost at inventory level 0; i.e., i G i 0 . In Table 6 , we show the percent savings that our Markovian policy can achieve over the aforementioned nonMarkovian policy when the problem parameters in the default setting of N -machine capacity and modified Poisson demand are set at various N , , p, and q values.
The closer p + q is to 2, the less "independent" the capacity levels over adjacent periods are, and the more one can predict future capacity levels from the current capacity level. In essence, the Markovian policy heeds the prediction, while the non-Markovian policy does not. Hence, the percent savings are greater for p q -pairs with p + q close to 2. On the other hand, when p + q is close to 0, the capacity levels tend to oscillate from period to period, and not much action can be taken to utilize the accurate Table 5 .
Theorem 5 assumptions: The capacity Markov process is stochastically nonmonotone. prediction. Therefore, the percent savings at p = q = 0 9 or 0.95 are, in general, larger than those at p = q = 0 1. There is also a general trend that the fewer machines the firm has, the greater percent savings it can achieve. This is largely because the firm's capacity level is more volatile when there are fewer machines, and consequently the information about the current capacity level is more valuable for predicting future levels.
In general, the percent savings are not very impressive under our default N -machine capacity setting. When we use the polarized capacity model (with N = 20), we can obtain more savings. The savings are more dramatic when the discrete uniform demand distribution is used. Such a demand distribution also gives us a chance to adjust not only the mean demand level, but also the demand variance.
In Figure 1 , we display the percent cost savings under the new settings when the particular demand distribution varies. In the figure, the discrete uniform demand distribution U a b is represented by two parameters, the mean E = E = a + b /2 and the standard deviation
A larger Std represents a larger demand variability, and Std = 0 implies a deterministic demand.
In Figure 1 , the percent cost savings decrease in a fairly dramatic way as the demand variance increases. When the demand variance is higher, the benefit of knowing more about future capacity levels is more likely to be offset by the uncertainty in future demand levels. Hence, the degree Figure 1 .
Comparison with the policy not using the Markovian property under different demand distributions. to which the quality of the firm's production and outsourcing decisions depends on the quality of future capacity predictions should decrease as the demand variance increases. Also, the percent cost savings first increase and then decrease with the mean demand level. In general, the higher the demand level, the more relevant the capacity level is in the decision process. Therefore, the rising mean demand levels make the benefits of knowing more about future capacity levels more useful. However, when the mean demand level becomes much higher than the mean capacity level, outsourcing costs will dominate production costs under both of our treatments, and thus the percent cost savings from production will begin to decrease.
In Figure 2 , we display the percent cost savings under different unit outsourcing costsq and different demand distributions U a b with N = 8.
In Figure 2 , the percent cost savings increase with the outsourcing cost. The firm can use outsourcing to partially offset the imperfection in its production decision. However, more costly outsourcing makes this less possible, and at the same time makes the quality of the production decision more accountable for the combined quality of production and outsourcing decisions. Thus, knowing more about future capacity levels becomes more imperative when the outsourcing cost increases. We can repeat the observation in Figure 2 , as in Figure 1 , that the percent cost savings first increase and then decrease with the mean demand level.
Figure 2.
Comparison with the policy not using the Markovian property under different outsourcing costs. Table 7 .
Comparison with the policy without the outsourcing option. 
Drivers of the Outsourcing Option Value
We now compare the policies with and without outsourcing opportunities. The latter policy can be obtained by making outsourcing setup cost K = + . Obviously, the opportunity to outsource helps the firm to reduce its total cost. What we are interested in knowing is the magnitude of the cost reduction and what factors may affect these magnitudes.
The percent cost savings due to the outsourcing opportunity under various parameter changes are listed in Table 7 . When outsourcing is more expensive, the firm uses outsourcing less, and the difference between having and not having the outsourcing option becomes narrower. In particular, we have varied the outsourcing setup cost K and the unit outsourcing costq, respectively, while keeping other parameters at their default values.
The option of outsourcing is also more valuable when inventory costs are higher. Also, the percent cost savings increase more rapidly with the unit backlogging costb 0 . After all, the outsourcing opportunity allows orders backlogged due to in-house capacity slack to be filled quickly.
The value of the outsourcing option increases quickly with the demand level. When = 16 or 18, which is larger than E = 15, the cost function for the withoutoutsourcing case still converges due to the help of the discount factor. However, during the actual execution of its optimal policy, the firm will have to let the backlogging level pile up toward + , which is not realistic at all. In this sense, when the average demand level is above the average capacity level, the option of outsourcing guarantees a feasible stable solution, which is otherwise unavailable.
Finally, we study the benefit of using the outsourcing option under different mean demand levels and demand variabilities by employing the discrete uniform demand distribution under different values of E and Std. The percent cost savings results are listed in Figure 3 . These results clearly show that even under the same mean demand level, using the outsourcing option can achieve more cost savings when demand levels are more volatile, while at the same time, they still show that the outsourcing option is more valuable under larger mean demand levels. We may explain the first new trend by drawing an analogy with results in queueing theory: More volatile demand levels, even under the same mean, are bound to lead to higher backlogging levels without the remedy of an outsourcing option. Hence, Figure 3 .
Comparison with the policy not using the outsourcing option under different demand distributions. 
Standard Deviation (Std) of Demand Distribution
Percentage Savings E = 14.5 E = 14 E = 13.5
the difference of the results between having and not having the outsourcing option widens as demand variance grows.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied the operational problem of how a firm, facing a Markovian stream of available capacity levels and an independent random stream of demand levels, can optimally carry out its day-to-day production and outsourcing activities. Under very reasonable cost assumptions, we have shown that the firm's outsourcing policy should always be of the capacity-dependent s S type; and under some more assumptions, we have proved that the firm's production policy should be of the capacity-dependent modified basestock type. When the capacity Markov process is stochastically monotone, we have been able to show that the policy parameters all decrease in the current capacity level. We have also extended our results to the infinite-horizon and undiscounted-cost versions of the problem. Our computational study has demonstrated the necessity of some of our assumptions. The study has also clearly shown the benefits of utilizing the Markovian property of the capacity and of exercising the outsource option.
More specifically, we can draw a few conclusions from the computational study. A firm would be better off if managers were alert to the time continuity of its production capacity, especially when (1) the continuity is strong enough to render the stochastically independent description of the capacity levels very inaccurate, (2) the mean demand level is high in comparison with the mean capacity level, (3) demand forecasts tends to be accurate, or (4) the outsourcing option is expensive. Also, retaining an outsourcing option is beneficial to the firm, especially when (1) the option is cheap relative to in-house production; (2) inventory holding or, more importantly, backlogging is expensive; (3) the mean demand level is high compared to the firm's own capacity level; or (4) it is difficult to make accurate demand forecasts.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove this theorem by induction. When t = 0, the induction hypotheses are obviously true. Now, we suppose the hypotheses are true for t − 1 for some t 1, and will prove that it is true for t as well. We will prove the consequence of the induction hypotheses along the way. Now, G t−1 y is continuous and continuously dif- 
(31) In view of Condition (a) and (22), we must have
and hence
(33) Note that the optimal production level is simply governed by
(34) By (31) and (17), we have
(35) Also, G t−1 w is continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable. By combining these with (32), (16), and (15), we can get
So, F t J is continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable. By combining these and (18), we then have that G t y is continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable, and that
where 0. Therefore, R t J is upward. Also, Lemma 4 about the boundedness of d y G t y leads to the boundedness of R t J . By Condition (e) and the aforementioned fact about the convolution between an upward and bounded function and a PF 2 function, we can conclude that d y G t y is upward.
To prove that d y G t 0 0, we only have to note that R t J 0 for J 0, and yet
On the other hand, we have 
Therefore, Condition (d) will lead to that d y G t ¯ t 0.
Details for Section 5
Define function L I = t =1
−1 E H I − s=1 t−s+1 to be the average holding-backlogging cost from period t to the end when the initial inventory level is I and no production or outsourcing is ever carried out.
Lemma 5. For any , I 0, and t 0, when
Proof. By the fact that E < + , for any 0, we have the Chebyshev-type inequality
By the convexity of H I and positivity of I, we have
Combine (43) and (44), and we obtain
Consequently,
Corollary 1. For any , I 0, and t 0, when I > 0, we have
Proof. On any sample path of the t-period problem with an initial state I , we may adopt the optimal decisions for the corresponding sample path of the t-period problem with an initial state I + I , where its inventory level is always I higher than that of the former state. In this way, the production and outsourcing costs are the same on both paths. Certainly, the optimal decisions for the former path can perform even better. Therefore,
where the x s s and z s s are the optimal production and outsourcing levels when the system starts in the beginning of period t at state I + I ; the second inequality utilizes the positivity of the abovementioned levels and the convexity of H I . We then have the desired result by Lemma 5.
For convenience, define U t y so that
By (3), we know that
Corollary 2. For any , y 0, and t 0, when y > 0,
Proof. On any sample path of the t-period problem starting from postproduction level y, we may adopt the optimal decisions for the corresponding sample path of the t-period problem starting from postproduction level y + y. The rest follows the argument in the proof of Corollary 1.
Assumptions 4 and 5 will be needed from now on. For any t = 1 2 , define constantsw t andȳ t so that
By Assumptions 4 and 5, bothw t andȳ t are positive,
< + andȳ * = sup ȳ t t = 1 2 < + . The following result is essential for the proof of Theorem 7 and is also used in the proof of Theorem 6 later on.
Corollary 3. For any period t = 1 2
, the firm's optimal outsource-up-to level w * t J max J w t max J w * .
Proof. By Corollary 1, Relationship (9), Assumptions 4 and 5, and the definition ofw t , F t w increases in w when w w t . However, the firm always has the option to outsource exactly to max J w t . Thus, we have the desired result.
The following result is used in the proof of Theorem 6, even though a slightly weaker result would suffice.
Corollary 4. For any period t = 1 2
, the firm's optimal produce-up-to level y * t I max I min I + ȳ t max I min I + ȳ * .
Proof. By Corollary 2, Relationship (49), Assumptions 4 and 5, and the definition ofȳ t , U t y increases in y when y ȳ t . However, the firm always has the option to produce exactly to max I min I + ȳ t . Thus, we have the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 6. In a t − 1 -period problem, we can always adopt the first t − 1 -period portion of the optimal policy for the t-period problem with the same initial state. Then, on corresponding sample paths, when I 0 for the t − 1 -period problem is some I , I 1 for the t-period problem is also I . However, by (4) and (5), we have
and hence,
where the first inequality is due to Assumption 5 and the particular nature of the inner optimization, and the second inequality is due to the positivity of the costs and the particular nature of the outer optimization. Averaging over all corresponding sample paths, we obtain
where the first expectation should be understood to have taken into account the behavior of the underlying policy, and the second inequality is due to the fact that the inventory level can decrease no more than the current demand level after each period.
On the other hand, in the t-period problem, we can always adopt the optimal policy for the t − 1 -period problem for the first t − 1 periods, and then neither produce nor outsource in Period 1. Therefore,
where again the first expectation has taken into account the behavior of the underlying policy, and the second inequality is due to Corollaries 3 and 4, which limit the increment of the inventory level, and the fact that the inventory level can decrease no more than the current demand level in any period, and Assumption 1. Combining (54) and (55) while taking the fact that E < + into consideration, we obtain a positive constant A such that
converges absolutely and the remnant term + =t+1 converges to 0. Therefore, G t I t = 0 1 2 is a Cauchy sequence at every I -pair, and hence, converges to some G I . Also, from the form of the coefficient term in (56), we know that the convergence is uniform in any region of the I -space with a bounded I-projection.
We know that G I = −p · I + G I . By Theorem 6, G I is the limit of G t I . The following lemma about G I will be useful in §5.2.
Lemma 6. For any and I, G I 0.
Proof. By Corollaries 3 and 4, in a t-period problem starting from I , I 0 is bounded from above by Q · 1 + I for some positive constant Q. Because all other costs except the terminal cost are positive, we have G t I − t Q · 1 + I . The result is true due to Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 7. Due to (56) and the fact that G 0 I = 0, there is a positive constant C such that G t−1 I C · 1 + I . By Theorem 6 and the Dominated Convergence Theorem, F t w converges to F w , which is defined in (9) with G I on the righthand side; and at any fixed , with F t w − F w being bounded by a linear function of w , the convergence is uniform in any bounded w-region. Also, it is easy to see that there is a positive constant D such that F t w D · 1 + w . By Corollary 3, at any Jpair, the infimum in (8) is effectively taken in the uniformly bounded w-region J max J w * . Then, F t J converges to F J , which is defined by (8) with F w on the right-hand side.
In turn, at any fixed , with F t J − F J being bounded by a linear function of J , the above convergence is uniform in any bounded J -region; and F t J is bounded by L · 1 + J for some positive L. Then, also due to the fact that E < + , Assumption 1, and the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we know that G t y converges to G y , which is defined by (7) with F J on the right-hand side; and that the convergence is uniform in any bounded y-region. At any I -pair, the infimum in (6) is taken in a uniformly bounded y-region. Hence, we have that G t I converges to the right-hand side of (6) with G y replacing G t y .
Proof of Theorem 8. The K-convexity of G I is due to the pointwise convergence of the K-convex G t I s to it and the fact that K-convexity sustains pointwise convergence. In the first special case, the upwardness of y G y is due to the pointwise convergence of upward G t y s to G y and the simple fact that upwardness sustains pointwise convergence. In the second special case, the convexity of G I is due to the pointwise convergence of the convex G t I s to it and the fact that convexity sustains pointwise convergence. The consequent results follow similar arguments in Theorems 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 9. The first two results can be proved by employing the relevant results in Theorems 4, 5, and 6, and by using the basic fact about the interchangeability of monotonicity and convergence. The consequence of the second result can be achieved by using similar arguments in Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 10. Starting from state 0 I 0 , the firm can opt to always produce nothing and outsource all just-realized demand in every period. Hence, we have
and therefore, g 0 I 0 K +rE < + . Because there is always a converging subsequence in a bounded sequence, we have the intended result.
For capacity levels 1 and 2 , define stopping time C 2 1 so that
is the number of future periods needed for the capacity level to reach exactly 2 for the first time when the current capacity level is 1 . For a positive integer I, define stopping time D I so that
is the smallest number of periods needed for the cumulative demand from the current period on to exceed level I. Assumptions 6 and 7 will be needed from now on. By a direct application of Wald's Identity and the limiting theorem for the excess in the renewal theory (Wolff 1989) , and due to Assumptions 6 and 7, we have the existence of a positive constant L such that
Therefore, we know that E D I < + , and therefore D I < + almost surely. Assumption 8 will be needed from now on.
Proof of Theorem 11. First, for any two pairs 1 I 1 and 2 I 2 , we are to show that
is bounded from above by a value that is independent of . Without loss of generality, we assume that I 1 I 2 . When the system's current state is 1 I 1 , the firm can opt to produce nothing and outsource I 2 − I 1 + 0 items in period 0. Then in period −1, the system's state is 1 I 2 . From this period on, the firm can opt to always produce nothing and outsource all just-realized demand in every period until period − C 2 1 , at which the system is in state 2 I 2 . Due to Lemma 6, the positivity of all costs, and the fact that ∈ 0 1 , collect all costs from period 0 to this period, and we have periods.
In period 1
− 1, the system's state becomes 1 I 1 . Again, due to Lemma 6 and the facts that all costs are positive and that ∈ 0 1 , collect all costs from period 0 to the aforementioned period, and we will have
Combining (61), (62), the definition for G I , the facts that G I =p · I + G I , E < + , and E > 0, and Assumption 8, we can conclude that there exists a positive constant B, such that for any and I,
Using Cauchy's diagonal argument, we can find a subsequence i n n = 0 1 2 such that for every and I, G i n I converges as n tends to + . For more detail, the reader may refer to the proof of Theorem 11 in Yang et al. (2004) .
The proof of Theorem 12 can be done in a similar fashion to that for the latter is done, given that we have found an upper bound for w * J that is uniform in . The earlier boundsw (the -superscript is new) found right before Corollary 3 grow in towards + as tends to 1 − . Therefore, we need a new bound for at least those s that are close to 1. Lemma 8, which is preceded by the necessary Lemma 7, does exactly this.
Lemma 7. Supposet = 1 2 ,¯ = 3/4 1/ t−1 , and I = tE 
By the way¯ is defined, for ∈ ¯ 1 we find
Combine (65) and (66) Proof. On any sample path of the -discounted infinitehorizon problem with initial state I , we may for the first few periods adopt the optimal decisions as though we are on the corresponding sample path for the -discounted infinite-horizon problem with initial state I + 1 , until the pre-outsourcing level becomes strictly less than 0, at which point we may outsource one item more than what we would optimally outsource on the corresponding sample path. Afterwards, we may act optimally.
Let x 0 x −1 and z 0 z −1 be the production and outsourcing decisions before the pre-outsourcing level reaches below 0. 
where the second inequality is due to the facts that all terms but the last one inside I H · are positive by the definition of O I and that H I is convex. The third inequality is due to (69) and the range of , the fourth inequality is due to Lemma 7, and the last inequality is due to the wayt is defined.
From (9), we see that w F w q − p + p −q = 1 − q 0 when w I − 1. Then by (8), we obtain the consequent result.
With Lemma 8 and the earlier boundsw that are obviously bounded for ∈ 0 ¯ , we know that w * J is bounded by a constant (independent of ).
Proof of Theorem 12. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 7, and is particularly close to that for Theorem 12 in Yang et al. (2004) . The only current difficulty lies in proving the interchangeability of the limit and infimum related with (8). However, that has been taken care of by the -independent bound for w Proof. On any sample path of a problem starting from postproduction level y, we may for the first few periods adopt the optimal decisions as though we are on the corresponding sample path for the problem with postproduction level y + 1, until the pre-outsourcing level becomes strictly less than 0, at which point we may outsource one item more than what we would optimally outsource on the corresponding sample path. Afterwards, we may act optimally. Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 9, we have
Then, by (49), we obtain the consequent result.
Assumption 9 will be needed from now on. For any and positive I, define stopping time C−D I , which describes the smallest number of periods needed for the average total capacity to catch up with I plus the average total demand:
Assumption 10 will be needed from now on.
The following Lemma 11 can be thought of as the dual of Lemma 9. It provides the lowest pre-outsourcing inventory level at which the firm must have a strictly positive outsourcing level, and also provides the firm's lowest outsource-up-to level when outsourcing is invoked. The proof is slightly more involved than that for Lemma 9, but is still similar in spirit. Proof. On any sample path of the problem with initial state I , we may for the first few periods adopt the optimal decisions as though we are on the corresponding sample path for the problem with initial state I − 1 , until either the pre-outsourcing level reaches such a negative level that the optimal decision for the corresponding sample path would outsource a strictly positive level, or when the preproduction level reaches such a negative level that the optimal decision for the corresponding sample path would produce up to a strictly positive level, at which point we may outsource or produce one item less than what we would optimally outsource or produce on the corresponding sample path. Afterwards, we may act optimally. Because the first-ever strictly positive outsourcing activity at a positive preoutsourcing level must occur after some strictly positive production activity, either one of the above two "stopping" events must occur.
Let x 0 x −1 and z 0 z −1 be the production and outsourcing decisions. Define stopping times O1 I and P I so that 
where the second inequality is due to the strict negativity of the terms inside − I H · , the convexity of H I , and the fact that 
where the second inequality is due to the negativity of the terms inside − I H · , Assumption 9, and the convexity of H I , and the third inequality is due to Assumption 10. Proof. When we produce items one at a time, whenever the current inventory level is strictly less than 0, producing will, obviously, only reduce cost.
Proof of Theorem 15. Let 0 be the set of all historydependent policies that behave according to the rule set for the optimal policy in Lemmas 9, 10, 11, and 12. Suppose ∈ 0 and the system starts from initial state 0 I 0 , and evolves under the policy . Then, it is easy to see that the system's post-outsourcing level, and hence the next-period preproduction level, is always in the interval J L + 1 I U . Therefore,
due to (63), which is obviously also satisfied by G I . Hence, the desired result is achievable.
